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Viktoriia Sibir: What was military cooperation between Yugoslavia – the Soviet Union/Russia
and how was it reflected during the Balkan wars in the nineties? 
(Under the direction of Graeme B Roberts)
Military cooperation between countries is multi-layered and complex. From one 
perspective it is about enhancing security and defense, arms trading, promotion of new 
technologies and joint actions against a common enemy. From another viewpoint, there is always
a danger of misuse, betrayal and the emergence of a national security threat since international 
relations are a subject to change, while assets like foreign military bases are stable.
 By selling arms and settling military bases the Soviet Union, and later Russia, enforced 
their positions and were able to support specific sides in conflicts in post-Soviet countries. 
In my thesis I have researched how military cooperation between the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia changed through the years of the existence of two federations. I will show, based on 
research findings presented, that Soviet/Russian influence can be identified in army staff 
training, the weapons used since WWII and a significant diaspora population (Russian emigrants 
to Croatia and Serbia). I will also discuss how a century-long cooperation between Yugoslavia 
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In examining military cooperation between Yugoslavia – the Soviet Union/Russia and how 
it was reflected during Balkan wars in the nineties, I will consider several periods: WWI, WWII, 
before the Split, after the Split by Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev, and the latest period of 
cooperation between Russia and Serbia. 
The idea of this thesis is to show how military cooperation between Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union formed a background for further conflict in the Balkans and how it shaped the 
Yugoslav military. I will show how the relationships that created Soviet military bases along with
joint operations, arms trade and intelligence exchange led to armed conflicts wherever this 
cooperation took place. I will concentrate on institutional and ideological similarities and 
examine intelligence connections in order to show how Soviet and Yugoslav connections shaped 
this military cooperation.
I started by comparing the Serbian invasion of Croatia in 1992 with Russian aggression in 
the Ukraine in 2014 the similarities between the two campaigns.  This investigation led to further
research which indicated how the Soviet Union and later Russia had backed Milosovic in his 
attempts to create a “Greater Serbia”.  However, there was insufficient undeniable evidence to 
make the claim of direct connection.
All the information that I uncovered in my preliminary research and based my further 
research on involved personal connections between Soviet nomenklatura and Yugoslav leaders, 
common communist pasts, a wide network of spies from both sides, trade and Yugoslav gas 
dependence, and high interest of the Soviet Union in having another puppet-government in 
Europe. 
However, moving forward, I decided to concentrate on military cooperation between these 
countries to show the complexity of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
In discussing similarities between military conflicts in post-Soviet countries, I found that all of 
them had Soviet military bases on their territory and performed common operations. I have 
compiled a set of examples with explanations of each to provide greater background to the
 situation.  I will use it to support my idea of how military invasions were similar between the 
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countries on which I have based my research. To be precise, I am solely considering military 
assets, not diplomatic relations, economy, or any of the other items that are part of the full scope 
of international relations between countries.
Moldova
14th Guard Army (Soviet Ground Forces) dislocated in Kyshynev (Moldova) in 1956-1984, 
then headquarters moved to Tiraspol (now – Transnistria). According to the Army sources, local 
Transnistrians made up the great majority of its soldiers, including 51 percent of the officers and 
79 percent of the draftees1.
While the official policy of the Russian Federation early after the outbreak of the 
widespread armed conflict in 1992 was one of neutrality, many soldiers and officers of the 14th 
Army were sympathetic to the PMR (Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic) cause and had 
defected to the PMR and actively participated in the fighting as part of its armed forces, the 
Republican Guards. Furthermore, a considerable amount of the army's materiel was taken 
without resistance or given to the PMR armed forces. With the beginning of Transnistrian War in 
March 1992 14th Army fully supported separatist movements and under command of Russian 
Major General Lebed led the war to its climax2.
Georgia
After Georgian independence in 1991 Russians still controlled a number of military bases, 
among them – Vaziani, Gudauta, Bakumi and Akhalkaki3. Russian troops were placed in both 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2008 Russian troops based on a territory of South Osetia region 
rapidly took part in a conflict with Georgia. 
Ukraine
Crimea has been a home port for Russian military ships since 1954, when Crimea was 
transferred to the Ukrainian SSR, since that time the Russian Federation paid an annual lease to 
Ukraine. A Partition Treaty on the status and conditions of the Black Sea Fleet was signed 
between the Ukraine and Russia in 1997, and established two independent national fleets, 
1 Marko Hajdinjak, “Smuggling in Southeast Europe: The Yugoslav Wars and the Development of Regional 
Criminal Networks in the Balkans” (CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY, 2002).
2 Ibid
3 “Analysis: Roots of the Conflict between Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia - Times Online,” web.archive.org, 
August 12, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20080812234237/,,http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
europe/article4498709.ece. 
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divided armaments and bases between them, setting out conditions for basing of the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. In 2010 this agreement was prolonged until 2042 by the Kharkiv 
Pact, however with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia unanimously denounced treaty.  
The presence of Russian troops and bases in Sevastopol played a crucial role in the Russian 
invasion of Ukraine in 20144. 
Lithuania
After declaring independence in 1990 Lithuania had to gain this independence in truth. 
Russian airborne troops occupied several buildings in Vilnius and stayed there until protests in 
19915, organised by the so-called “Russophone population”. 
The presence of Russian troops formed a base for other military units, which were sent to tame 
protesters and led to a further massacre where 14 people were killed and approximately one 
thousand injured. 
I am providing these examples to show how the military presence of Russian troops in 
various regions created a method of support for various conflicts in the post-Soviet era. By the 
time clashes started, buildings, assets, weapons and soldiers, loyal to their country and 
supporting its interests abroad were already in place and had been for an extended period of time.
The same was applicable to JNA bases around the former Yugoslavia. Later in Chapter 2, I will 
examine locations of JNA troops and their impact in the Balkan wars.
Here I draw parallels between the post-Soviet agenda in the former republics and Serbian 
actions in Croatia and Bosnia, where, after WWII populations were mixed along with military 
assets. So, when it came to the invasion of the JNA, Croatian Knin played the role of a Trojan 
horse, in the same way as Russian soldiers based in Crimea acted as part of the Russian 
invasion6. 
Hybrid threats, such as these, are changing daily, however, only the means are being 
changed, the ends are still the same. In discussing the presence of military bases in foreign 
4Schreck, Carl. “From ‘Not Us’ To ‘Why Hide It?’: How Russia Denied Its Crimea Invasion, Then Admitted 
It.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, February 26, 2019. 
https://www.rferl.org/a/from-not-us-to-why-hide-it-how-russia-denied-its-crimea-invasion-then-admitted-it/
29791806.html. 
5Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com. “The January Bloodbath in Lithuania 25 Years on | DW | 13.01.2016.” 
DW.COM, 2016. https://www.dw.com/en/the-january-bloodbath-in-lithuania-25-years-on/a-18976152. 
6Steven Pifer, “Five Years after Crimea’s Illegal Annexation, the Issue Is No Closer to Resolution,” Brookings 
(Brookings, March 18, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/18/five-years-after-
crimeas-illegal-annexation-the-issue-is-no-closer-to-resolution/. 
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countries, I would like to draw attention to the further outcomes that will be possible with the 
constant changing of foreign policies. Having noted the precedents of Russian support of 
separatists in different countries, I would like to underline the danger of such cooperation. 
Wherever Russian bases are situated, there would always be a risk of invasion.
Moreover, with a publication of the Russia Report by the Intelligence and Security 
Committee to British Parliament7 it has become clear that Russian assets in intelligence and 
counterintelligence are highly developed and multi-layered. Here, my point is that joint military 
operations with the Russian Federation could be a high risk for other countries in terms of 
leakage of information: “the Russian Intelligence Services will analyze whatever we put in the 
public domain and therefore, on this subject more than any other, the potential to damage the 
capabilities of the intelligence and security Agencies and Defence Intelligence was both real and 
significant” (p.2 “Russia” ISC).
Analyzing relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, I found that the majority of 
sources discuss periods before the Split and after Brezhnev’s death. Discussions of cooperation 
between these two countries, mainly concentrate on propaganda and diplomatic affairs. I would 
like to collect here data on military trading and joint actions through all the periods of 
federations’ relations to show how they impacted the JNA formation and what led to their 
readiness for invasion in 1992.
A point further noted is that sources mainly provide information about Russian military 
presence in a country without mentioning its legacy and terms when writing about examples of 
post-Soviet countries. 
Even though Yugoslavia was of a high interest for both the USA and the Soviet Union, it is 
hard to claim its undoubted loyalty to either one of the sides. Military, the area in which I based 
my research, simplifies outcomes to exact figures and numbers of weapons bought and sold, 
operations performed, and bases built. The JNA’s armament consisted of British, Canadian and 
Soviet arms, and that was not an ideological point – until the break-up of Yugoslavia, it had 
always been a question of current benefit, not political loyalty. 
In the second chapter I will write about the Russian mercenaries who fought on the side of 
the Serbs, and became a solid base for the army. A large proportion of the soldiers came from the 
Transnistrian War, took part in suppression of protests all-over post-Soviet countries and came to
Balkans already having experience in national conflicts. There I draw parallels with the Russian 
7   “Publication of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia Report:Written Statement -   HCWS403,” UK
Parliament,  2020,  https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/  written-
statement/Commons/2020-07-21/HCWS403/. 
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mercenaries  in the post-Soviet countries. The point is, that by these means, Russia continued to 
have an impact on the foreign policy agenda of former satellite countries.
However, from  another perspective, I will examine the differences between armies in 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
Even within the scope of a single century the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have managed 
to create a long and complex story.  While the two states have themselves, officially, ended; 
military cooperation between the original states and the states that have replaced them has not.  
This has created another source for both pressure and bargaining.
There is another point of Western support provided to Croatia8 in terms of the Balkan wars, 
that shows the bilateral structure of international influence on these wars. However, in this thesis 
I will concentrate on the Soviet/Russian – Serbian relations.  While that international influence 
cannot be denied it is less relevant to the discussion at hand and would only serve to further 




MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SOVIET UNION
In the first chapter I will write about military cooperation between Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union from the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Here I want to show that although relations have not always been smooth, some level of 
cooperation took place during each period and that this cooperation could be observed. The 
Balkans, situated on the crossing of trade routes in Europe and with access to the sea, have been 
a stumbling block firstly for the empires during world wars and then between the Soviet Union 
and West during the Cold War. 
My input here would be in organizing ideas of what has been written on subject of military 
interconnection between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and showing how it was repaid during 
Balkan wars in 1990s. 
1.1. Before and during WWI
Although officially known as the Kingdom of Serbia, Serbian attempts to organize its own 
army were prevented by neighboring empires. Thus, in the middle of nineteenth century with the 
Yedren Treaty, Russia gained patronage over the Serbian Army. A small army was organized on 
the base of Russian laws, officers and traditions.  Bjelalac Mile describes this army foundation as
non-favorable for Austria as, during a short period, an infantry battalion, equine squadron and a 
gun battery were founded. Moreover, a group of soldiers was sent to Russia to be educated as 
officers9
The Russian Empire and Kingdom of Serbia were allies even though this was not officially 
declared. They shared a common ground based on religious orthodoxy. According to Barbara 
Jelavic10, the Balkans have always been an important security issue for the Russian Empire, and 
9  Mile Bjelajac and Gordana Krivokapić-Jović, Prilozi Iz Naučne Kritike--Srpska Istoriografija i Svet : (Uticaj 
Jugoslovenske Krize Na Stranu i Domaću Istoriografiju) (Beograd: Institut Za Noviju Istoriju Srbije, 2011). 
10 Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914 (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
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the last protected southern frontier.  This was done using mythology of protection of Slavs and 
Orthodox Christians even after a declining of the Panslavism paradigm.
When the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand led Austria-Hungary to a declaration of war on 
Serbia, the Russian Empire mobilized its troops to send them not only to protect the Kingdom of 
Serbia, but also to protect its status as the Great Power, that finally led to the Great War (World 
War I)11.
Turner12 writes, that when the War minister, Sukhomlinov, held a conference of military 
commanders to decide on a mobilization of the whole military district of Kyiv and part of the 
Warsaw district, it was decided on “the relatively mild measure of extending by six months the 
term of service of conscripts eligible for discharge” (p.70)13 However, with the continuation of 
war the whole district was mobilized. 
Serbia unexpectedly gained in allies a huge military power.
1.2 Between the wars
After the Bolshevik victory in 1920 and until 1940 relations between Soviet Union and the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia remained cold, mostly because of anti-communist mood of the latter. 
However, as Filip Škiljan states in his work “Rusi u Hrvatskoj”, it was a large wave of 
immigration of Russian officers fled to Yugoslavia under command under General Wrangel. In 
1924 he founded the Russian All-Military Union in Sremski Karlovci, a town in an autonomous 
province, Vojvodina. The declared aim was to gather all the veterans of White Movement and 
provide them with aid, the unofficial aim was to maintain a military force under Russian control 
to fight Bolsheviks. According to Slobodan Klakih14 the number of Russian soldiers at that time 
in Vojvodina was about 25 000 and the whole population of migrants reached 40 000. Part of 
soldiers were entitled to become Yugoslav board guards. 
That was also a period when Soviets started sending their agents of influence and spies to 
Yugoslavia. Firstly, it was done to eliminate the White Movement leaders and recruit agents 
11 Ibid
12 L. C. F. Turner, “The Russian Mobilization in 1914,” Journal of Contemporary History 3, no. 1 (January 
1968): 65–88, https://doi.org/10.1177/002200946800300104. 
13 Ibid
14 Кљакић, Слободан. “„Црни Барон” у Београду.” Politika Online. Accessed August 6, 2020. 
http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/393675/Drustvo/Crni-baron-u-Beogradu 
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among the Yugoslav command. However, later it led to an attempted coup to get rid of the 
Stojadinovic  government (the then Prime-minister of Kingdom of Yugoslavia). This was broadly
described in a Soviet officers’ memoirs, by Antononv, Tymofyev and Sudoplatov. The last writes 
in his “Special Tasks” that one of his friends, Petr Zubov, was assigned as a resident in Prague 
where he met with President Eduard Benesh. Via Zubov; Benesh offered the Soviet Union a 
subsidized coup in Yugoslavia, and asked for USD 200.000 in cash for the Serbian officers who 
had to perform the upheaval. However, after sum was received by Zubov, he decided that Serbian
officers were not trustworthy and refused to pay them. The coup didn’t take place, and Zubov 
was arrested on his return to Moscow15.  
However, Russian troops, trained and educated remained on the territory of the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia, forming a base for further clashes.
                                                                      
1.3. WWII
When Yugoslavia fell to Nazi occupation in April 1941, two resistance movements 
appeared.  The royalist “Cetniks” under Mihailovic’s command were opposed to Tito’s 
“Partizans”, who shared communist ideals. 
Tito had close connections with communists in the Soviet Union and received support from
the Red Army and the first material assistance was provided in the form of supplies sent by 
plane. 16 By 1942 it became clear to Tito that the partizan movement had to be re-organized, and 
he turned to the Soviet Union in search of material base and financial support. Aid promised, was
never to be delivered17 
However, in 1944 the Soviet Union started to support Tito’s partizans officially18 and the 
first operations on territories under control of the partizans took place in February 1944. It was 
followed by an agreement in September 1944, when the Red Army was already present in Serbia.
In early September 1944, when Soviet troops, enthusiastically greeted by the people of Bulgaria, 
moved further south and south-west, the Supreme Commander ordered the General Staff to 
15 Pavel Sudoplatov, and Anatoliĭ Pavlovich Sudoplatov. Special Tasks : The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness, a 
Soviet Spymaster. Boston: Back Bay Books, 1995 
16  Bulletin of International News , The Situation in Yugoslavia
17 C N Trueman, “The Resistance Movement in Yugoslavia,” History Learning Site, 2015, 
https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/resistance-movements/the-resistance-movement-in-
yugoslavia/. 
18 Craig Nation. War in the Balkans. University Press of the Pacific, 2004
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prepare materials on Yugoslav affairs.  The officers of the Operations Directorate of the General 
Staff immediately sat down to prepare the assignment. It turned out to be difficult as there were 
many questions to think about.
On the twentieth of September, Marshal Tito along with General Korneev, the head of 
military mission, flew to Moscow for negotiations. The Yugoslav war positions had significantly 
strengthened by that time. Several major offensive operations undertaken by the Nazis to defeat 
the Peoples’ Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (PLA) completely failed. At the same time, PLA 
was gaining strength, gained extensive experience in the war and reorganized itself 
organizationally. It was no longer a partisan army, but a modern regular army, which, however, 
still bore living traces of the past. It had 50 divisions, many brigades and detachments, which 
numbered almost 400 thousand soldiers hardened in the fight against the enemy. These troops not
only defended themselves, but attacked in an organized manner, clearing one region of the 
country after another from the invaders. In early September, 7 divisions of the PLA broke 
through into Serbia, which united with 5 divisions already operating in this republic. Now 12 
divisions successfully smashed the enemy garrisons here. During the first ten days of the 
September offensive, the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia liberated 98 cities and inflicted
significant damage on the enemy. The radio station "Free Yugoslavia" reported that the enemy 
lost 24 thousand killed and 11,900 captured soldiers and officers. The time was approaching for 
the meeting of the troops of the PLA and the Red Army19 .
I. Broz Tito was informed that assistance to Yugoslavia would be provided by the forces of 
the 3rd Ukrainian Front and the Danube River Flotilla. This was enough to defeat the enemy in 
the Belgrade area. In other parts of the country, the PLA hoped to finish off the Nazi invaders 
with their own forces. Stalin seized the moment and said that the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian 
Front was to advance into Hungary through the territory of Yugoslavia in the coming days, and it
would be demanded of the National Committee to give its consent to the temporary entry of 
Soviet troops there. This was demanded by the interests of the struggle against the common 
enemy. Iosif Broz Tito on behalf of the National Committee and the Supreme Headquarters of 
the JNA gave such consent20.
The Soviet offensive in September 1944 developed quite successfully on the southern flank
of the Soviet-German front. On September 30, their soldiers drove the enemy out of more than 
20 Yugoslavian settlements. The size of the territory of Yugoslavia liberated continued to grow 
19  Штеменко С. Генеральный штаб в годы войны. Москва: Воениздат, 1989
20  Ibid
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every day. During the pursuit of the enemy, units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front reached the eastern 
bank of the Danube. At the same time, the armies of the 3rd Ukrainian Front moved to the 
southern and western borders of Bulgaria. At the end of September, Lieutenant General N.A. 
Gagen's 57th army captured an area of the city of Vidin on the opposite, western bank of the 
Danube21.
By the end of the summer of 1944, the anti-fascist struggle of the Yugoslav people acquired
a new dimension. Day by day the ranks of the fighters multiplied. The high command of the PLA
firmly led the forces of the liberation war. In Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, in Vojvodina,
their own regional headquarters were created with the corresponding commanders. The 
recruitment of these military command and control bodies was carried out directly in the partisan
areas or on the above-mentioned mountainous island of Vis. The regional headquarters were 
transferred from the island to the place of hostilities. So the main headquarters of Serbia, headed 
by General Kocha Popovic, was formed and with the participation of Soviet officers was trained. 
With him in July 1944, Major General Gorshkov departed to the battle area22.
The main issue in the negotiations between the Yugoslav  and the Soviet governments in 
Moscow in the fall of 1944 was the organization of joint operations of the Red Army and the 
Yugoslav People's Liberation Army.
According to the Military Review vol. 6023 Soviet Union starting 1944 passed to 
Yugoslavia 96,000 riffles, 68,000 sub- and machine-guns, 2,364 mortars and 895 different guns 
of varying calibers.
In April 1945 the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and 
Collaboration with Yugoslavia, under the terms of which it was stipulated that the Soviets will 
continue providing economic and military assistance to Yugoslavia24.
However, supplies weren’t of the promised scale, and often problems with the spare parts 
occurred. 
To be added, that Red Army was many times accused of violence and breaking discipline25 that 
led to series of conflict between Tito and Stalin. 
21 Ibid
22 Ibid
23 Military Review (1980) Vol. 11
24 Ibid
25 Vojin Majstorović, “The Red Army in Yugoslavia, 1944–1945,” Slavic Review 75, no. 2 (2016): 396–421, 
https://doi.org/10.5612/slavicreview.75.2.396. 
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In the end, Yugoslav forces liberated themselves. This self-liberation, later became a crucial
point in relations with the Soviet Union. The 800,000 troops of the People's Liberation Army 
officially became the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) on March 194526. 
However, the army had basically the same position in the second Yugoslavia as they had in 
the first. As a result of a set of historical circumstances (i.e. having been subjected to Ustasha 
crimes and genocide after the military defeat of the first Yugoslavia), Serbs were the first to start 
the uprising and were the most numerous in the victorious army, especially among the higher 
ranks, promotion to which was based on length of war experience and military achievements. In 
the mentocracy, a place in the nomenclature was achieved by a proven readiness to use force and 
violence, not only in war but in peace as well, when an incessant struggle against various 
‘enemies’ continued. A successful career was therefore considered a kind of war booty (Popov 
2000: 106-108). The emphasizing of war merits implied certain benefits. Diligent work on a farm
or in a factory was considered unworthy of a soldier, although socialist-realist folklore for some 
time insisted on competition at the ‘work front’ .
A positive image of war and of soldiers dominated the public scene. The victorious Serb 
army was glorified as the decisive factor in ‘the liberation of its brethren’, from whom 
unconditional gratitude was expected. If the non-Serb population showed insufficient respect, or 
if it ‘created problems’ for the new regime, violent ‘pacification’ was carried out by the police, 
gendarmerie and army, bringing with it new traumas. The use of force brought pain to some, but 
was fruitful for others. Participation in the victorious side in the war went together not only with 
ideological support, but also with social promotion, allowing people to escape from joblessness 
and poverty to guaranteed work-in the army, the postal service, the railway service, the police 
and gendarmerie, all the way to careers in diplomacy and the highest positions in the state.
War traumas were even more deeply suppressed by the state’s legitimization of the war 
victory. In some circumstances, such legitimization might fade or be replaced by some other in 
the second or third generation (just as war profiteers usually become popular benefactors only 
from the second generation on), but this kind of evolution was halted suddenly by a new war. 
The rush for booty sometimes became so widespread that it actually threatened to compromise 
the legitimacy the order had gained by the war. This occurred following the war, when there was 
an increase in the number of soldiers waiting in queues to cash in their war merits, or when 
whole cities, otherwise subservient to the occupation force, were declared ‘hero cities’.
26 Trifunovska, S. Former Yugoslavia Through Documents From its Dissolution to the Peace Settlement 
(1999): Zagreb
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1.4. Split and Spies
The solid foundation for post-war Yugoslav-Soviet cooperation was defined by the Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in April 1945, in Moscow, between the Soviet and the 
Yugoslav delegation, led by Josip Broz Tito. Two socialist camps that celebrated victory ove 
Axis reassured each other in mutual support in further activities. However, Tito never agreed to 
be Stalin’s puppet, and the latter could not afford such a liberal position of his protegee. 
As Ivan Vejvoda states in “Yugoslavia 1945-91 – from Decentralization Without Democracy to 
Dissolution”, “Yugoslav communism was not imported by Soviet Red Army tanks”. His text 
explains the legacy of Yugoslav communism and shows how and why it differs from Soviet 
communism. Among the main features it is relative economic freedom and attempts of free 
market settling.
The same is discussed in Veljko Vujacic’s “Institutional origins of Contemporary Serbian 
Nationalism”, where he discusses differences in Yugoslav and Soviet federalism from the 
cultural and national perspectives.
Meanwhile, the countries cooperated on trade basis. Yugoslav communists expected that 
Soviet Union will provide an economic, military and personnel assistance as a contribution to the
construction of a new socialist order. Soviet instructors took part in the building of the Yugoslav 
Army and State Security Service, while hundreds of military cadets went to school in Moscow27 .
Between 1945 and 1948, the Soviet military had a strong formative influence on the new JNA. 
The Soviet model was followed in organization, training, and even uniform style. The Soviet 
Union built some of the first military infrastructure, including airfields, command posts, 
and coastal gun emplacements for Yugoslavia28. 
The split that happened between the two countries in 1948 did not fully disrupt all the 
connections – behind the curtain military trade took place along with tourist exchanges, gas 
supplies and common actions against the “capitalistic world”.
In spite of the differences between the two states there were also some similarities in how 
they operated. A party state counts on brute force only in extreme cases. The threat of force 
makes manipulation effective. Contrary to the classic Stalinist terror, Titoist terror was more 
selective, and it also counted more on corruption than on physical force (to ‘care about the 
27  Tvrtko Jakovina, Američki Komunistički Saveznik : Hrvati, Titova Jugoslavija i Sjedinjene Američke Države 
1945.-1955. (Zagreb: Profil International, 2003). 
28  Ibid
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people’ was a phrase commonly used by functionaries of the regime). A different standard of 
living and openness towards the world has its other face: it makes it easier to accept 
collaboration. Despite all the advantages compared to other regimes of ‘existing socialism’, the 
Yugoslav regime displayed signs of growing fear of various enemies, thus it persistently widened
its social basis through the militarization and police-ization of the whole society. A parallel army 
was created within the armed forces-the Territorial Defence (TO), which covered factories, 
institutions and schools, down to the local level. (The TO was to be the core of the national 
armies in the war). The General People’s Defence (ONO) system covered the whole society. In 
parallel with its practical activities-accasional military drills, permanent training (under the 
slogan ‘Nothing should surprise us’)-the ONO system also became part of regular education at 
all levels, from elementary school to university. Students were taught how to recognize and fight 
with the ‘enemy’. Social Self Protection (DSZ) was a general system of police surveillance and 
denunciation of suspicious persons, permanently in force, but particularly intense in so-called 
crisis situations. Although in the official ideology there was no admission of crisis, the more 
obvious symptoms of crisis, which included workers’ strikes, student movements (1 963 — 
1974), nationalist movements in Kosovo (1968-1971) and in Croatia (1970-1971), made the 
militarization of society more obvious. With the alleged spreading of self-management, the 
regime started to carry out a more rigid re-Stalinization which included political trials and bans 
on newspapers, books and journals, and the ‘personality cult’ reached its peak (Popov 2000: 167-
203,225-248).
As Vladimir Velebit, Tito’s advisor, stated in his interview on the reasons for the Soviet-
Yugoslavian split, the Soviets did not want Yugoslavia to develop its own oil industry, insisting 
that they would provide oil to Yugoslavia. They wanted to head this industry and control it. 29
Adam Ulam in his article “The Background of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute” says that the 
origins of the dispute had three main elements. There is, first, the story of the Soviet attitude 
towards the fight of the Partisans during the war, the attitude which, now that the veil has fallen 
from the eyes of the Yugoslavs, is seen to have been motivated by purely selfish considerations 
of Russian policy rather than by paternal regard for the cause of fellow communists.
Another issue was penetration of Soviet intelligence agents to structures that were close to 
Tito. The first overt fight between two states happened between KGB advisor in Belgrade, 
colonel lieutenant Tymofiev and the head of security service in Tito’s apparatus, Alexander-Leka 
29 Борис Камов, “Тайный Советник,” accessed March 1, 2002, https://www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/taynyy-
sovetnik/. 
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Rankovich.  The latter blamed Tymofiev for settling a spy network in Yugoslavia, however, the 
KGB advisor insisted that these were the individual cases, not the common practice.
In early September 1944, when Soviet troops, enthusiastically greeted by the people of Bulgaria, 
moved further south and south-west, the Supreme Commander ordered the General Staff to 
prepare materials on Yugoslav affairs.  The officers of the Operations Directorate of the General 
Staff immediately sat down to prepare the assignment. It turned out to be difficult as there were 
many questions to think about.
Meanwhile, according to Oleg Gordievsky, a former KGB officer, at that time recruitment 
was the main task of Soviet intelligence services in Yugoslavia. They infiltrated Tito’s apparatus 
(Minister forInfrastructure Andrija Hepbrang and Minister for Finance, Streten Zhujovich) and 
even his own security group. As Gordievsky claims in his book, when Tito heard about that, he 
was mad, saying that he would not allow any network of Soviet spies in Yugoslavia. In 
comparison with the countries of the Warsaw Pact, where the Soviets settled Communist 
governments, the Yugoslavs, who liberated themselves during the WWII, didn’t want to join 
another bloc. Literature on the split differs dramatically between Soviet and Yugoslavian authors,
however, all the texts mention the impossibility for Stalin and Tito to share power and influence. 
Barbara Jelavic in “History of Balkans” mentions that Tito was trying to head the communist 
movement all over Europe. She writes about his meetings with other communist leaders in 1946-
1947 that led to Soviet discontent.
Tito was called a British imperial agent, and the former ally became an enemy. As a reason 
for such accusation Soviets used Yugoslav contacts with the British – according to the evidences 
of Velebit. Soviet propaganda used Yugoslav images to create another “imperialistic enemy”.
However, in 1948 official cooperation was ended, Yugoslavia and Soviet Union continued their 
joint counter-intelligence actions.
Mostly it was about former Nazi agents, and in January of 1948 Rankovich sent to the 
Soviet Union an ex-colonel of the SS, Otto Reich, who was arrested in Zagreb. The closest 
connections took place in Vienna, where the intelligence services of both federations were 
working against former Nazis.30
A positive image of war and of soldiers dominated the public scene. The victorious Serb 
army was glorified as the decisive factor in ‘the liberation of its brethren’, from whom 
unconditional gratitude was expected. If the non-Serb population showed insufficient respect, or 
30 Leonid Gavrilovič Podgornov, Очерки Истории Российской Внешней Разведки в Шести Томах. Том 5, 
1945-1965 Годы. Očerki Istorii Rossijskoj Vnešnej Razvedki v Šesti Tomah. Tom 5, 1945-1965 Gody., vol. 5 
(Международные Отношения, Moskva: Meždunarodnye Otnošeniâ, 1999). 
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if it ‘created problems’ for the new regime, violent ‘pacification’ was carried out by the police, 
gendarmerie and army, bringing with it new traumas. The use of force brought pain to some, but 
was fruitful for others. Participation in the victorious side in the war went together not only with 
ideological support, but also with social promotion, allowing people to escape from joblessness 
and poverty to guaranteed work-in the army, the postal service, the railway service, the police 
and gendarmerie, all the way to careers in diplomacy and the highest positions in the state.
1.5 From Khrushchev to Gorbachev
With Stalin’s death a “warm” period in relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 
followed. Molotov called in the Yugoslav Charge d’Affaires; Dragoje Djuric to his chambers on 
6th of June 1953 and conveyed his government’s desire to exchange ambassadors with Yugoslavia
again. Following a positive response from the Yugoslav side, the Soviet Union sent Vasily 
Valkov to Belgrade as the new Soviet Ambassador on 21 July 1953 whereas his Yugoslav 
counterpart Dobrivoje Vidic set foot in Moscow at the end of September 195331 (Rajak, p.53).
Following series of mutual visits of delegations, the Belgrade declaration was signed in 
1955. It improved bilateral relations and provided the Soviet Union with a leading role in the 
supplies of arms and equipment.
War traumas were even more deeply suppressed by the state’s legitimization of the war 
victory. In some circumstances, such legitimization might fade or be replaced by some other in 
the second or third generation, but this kind of evolution was halted suddenly by a new war. The 
rush for booty sometimes became so widespread that it actually threatened to compromise the 
legitimacy the order had gained by the war. This occurred following the war, when there was an 
increase in the number of soldiers waiting in queues to cash in their war merits, or when whole 
cities, otherwise subservient to the occupation force, were declared ‘hero cities’. Although 
damaged by the break, military ties were renewed quickly after Soviet-Yugoslav relations were 
normalized. Annual bilateral exchanges began between the general staffs of the two countries. 
Although such cooperation gave the Soviet Union considerable influence with the Yugoslav 
military, Yugoslavia rebuffed Soviet requests for formal naval base access and airfield landing 
rights, along with giving priority to Soviet ships. Landing rights were granted to Soviet aircraft 
during the 1967 and 1973 Middle East wars. Yugoslavia established a regular contract to 
31 Svetozar Rajak, “Yugoslav-Soviet Relations, 1953-1957: Normalization, Comradeship, Confrontation” (PhD
Thesis, 2004). 
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maintain and repair Soviet submarines and submarine tenders in its shipyard at Kotor32, as it is 
mentioned in report on Yugoslavia and Soviet forces in the Mediterranean region.
The Yugoslav navy was upgraded when it acquired ten Osa-I class missile boats and four 
Shershen-class torpedo boats from the Soviet Union. The Soviets granted a license to build 
eleven additional Shershen units in Yugoslav shipyards developed for this purpose33.
In 1980 and 1982, the navy took delivery of two Soviet Koni-class frigates. In 1988 it 
completed two additional units under license. The Koni frigates were armed with four Soviet SS-
N-2B surface-to-surface missile launchers, twin SA-N-4 surface-to-air missiles, and 
antisubmarine rocket launchers.
As for ground and airtroops, according to the Yugoslav Military Encyclopedia34, in the 
1960s, Yugoslavia received Soviet T-34 and T54 /-55 tanks, first-generation antitank guided 
missiles, Osaclass missile boats, and MiG-21 fighters. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union sold Mi-4 
and Mi-8 helicopters and SA-2 and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles. Since 1985 Yugoslavia has 
received a license to produce a domestic version of the Soviet T-72 tank for its own use and for 
export. In the late 1980s, Yugoslavia was one of only a few countries to be sold the new Soviet 
MiG-29 fighter. At an estimated cost of US$20 million per aircraft, however, the MiG-29 was 
considered too expensive for Yugoslavia to purchase more than a few as models for its own 
aircraft industry35
The first official joint action between the intelligence services took place in 1986. The 
Soviet KGB and Yugoslavia’s national security apparatus had agreed to cooperate against 
terrorism. The agreement was announced after talks between Viktor Chebrikov, head of the 
KGB, and Yugoslav Interior Minister Dobroslav Culafic.36
The Russian military was less cautious, however, than the Russian civilian authorities. 
Russia’s military security intelligence had regular contacts with JNA and Serbian politicians 
32 Milan N Vego, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Policy of Force in the Mediterranean since 1961 (Alexandria, Va. 
(2000 N. Beauregard St., Alexandria 22311): Institute Of Naval Studies, Center For Naval Analyses, 1981). 
33 Ibid
34 Yugoslav Military Encyclopedia], Vol.IV, p.139
35 “Yugoslavia (Former)  Arms Imports - Flags, Maps, Economy, History, Climate, Natural Resources, Current 
Issues, International Agreements, Population, Social Statistics, Political System,” Photius.com (The Library of 
Congress, 2020), https://photius.com/countries/yugoslavia_former/national_security/
yugoslavia_former_national_security_arms_imports.html. 
36 “KGB and Yugoslavs Agree to Cooperate Against Terrorism,” AP NEWS, December 5, 1986, 
https://apnews.com/e35ee5621176be9149b2877b108fe9dc. 
16
(such as Gračanin, Milošević’s relative), members of the Academy, and the Serbian Orthodox 
Church.
There is lots of evidence that Soviet leaders had meetings with their Yugoslavian 
colleagues during the period from 1972 until the Yugoslav breakup. The first wave took place in 
1972-1974: Kosygin, Novikov, Kirilenko, Kulikov, Mazur and Katushev.
After Tito’s death these visits became more regular, and by 1986 Soviet diplomats and 
party leaders made regular visits meeting with the heads of the defense sector of Yugoslavia. 
Kuznetsov, Grishyn, Baybakov, Smirnov, Arkhipov, Gorshkov, Yepeshev and Inozemtsev formed
a group that oversaw Yugoslav affairs. All the people mentioned oversaw arms production and 
military service in the Soviet Union. It can be inferred that among other issues they discussed 
military cooperation with Yugoslavia.
To sum up, the evidence suggests that arms trade was not simply an economic issue, 
however, more of an instrument of foreign policy. In this way Soviet Union could control 
Yugoslavia force and keep it further from the West.
Europe and the West were marked as enemies of Yugoslavia, as much because of the 
destruction of Socialism as because of the dismantling of the Soviet Union as a state and military
power on which they depended. The army was not a state but a party force and, as such, the main
political factor offering decisive resistance to change37. Defending Yugoslavia from all her 
peoples, apart from the Serbs, and calling them ‘enemies’ along with party factions in Serbia 
which brought it to power, the army and its secret agents of power pulled Serbia into an anti-
modern revolution (S. Popovic, 2000), another name for the war which they prepared together.
During the twentieth century Russia, firstly as an empire, then as the Soviet Union, gained 
forces and infiltrated foreign countries with its’ agents of influence. In case of Yugoslavia, during
the WWII both sides of the Russian Civil War were present on the different sides – both as 
“cetniks” and “partizans”. Even cold relations after the Split did not impact military cooperation 
and the performance of joint operations. Since WWI, by different means, the Soviets were 
present in the Yugoslav agenda – either as partners, or as rivals, however, still having influence 
through various aspects – from military to religion. It was only a question of time when this 
hidden threat would arise again on a territory flooded with the Soviet arms and equipment.




In this chapter I will observe the cooperation between the two republics in the middle of 
their break-ups, concentrating mainly on Soviet/Russian input into JNA activities. Here I will 
pay particular attention to the locations of JNA bases to show how similar situations were with 
the ex-Soviet Army bases in the independent republics. As well, I will explore the presence of 
foreign mercenaries and their connection with the Milosevic family, finally I will sum up the 
second chapter with the current relations between Serbia and Russia, specifically in military 
field.
 JNA bases
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was created on base of Tito’s “partizans” movement in 
1945 and existed until 1992, when it was reorganized and passed under jurisdiction of Serbia and
Montenegro.
JNA was divided between three land and one naval districts, so-called “military regions”: 
First military region with headquarters in Belgrade (for eastern Croatia, northern and central 
parts of Serbia and parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina38) Second military region with headquarters 
in Zagreb (Slovenia and northern Croatia) Third military region with headquarters in Skopje 
(Macedonia, Southern Serbia and Montenegro) Military-naval region “Vojnopomorska oblast” 
with headquarters in Split.
Military-Naval Region included parts of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro 
- almost all of the Yugoslav coastline. It had a subdivision of three sectors including a flotilla and
one corp.
The Air and Air Defence Forces were headquartered at Zemun and had fighter and bomber 
aircraft, helicopters, and air defence artillery units at air bases throughout the former Yugoslavia.
When clashes started, Yugoslav forces were already there to back Milosevic’s policy.
38 Marijan Dayor, “The Yugoslav National Army Role in the Aggression Against the Republic of Croatia from 
1990 to 1992” (NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE, 2001). 
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In Slovenia, during the Ten-Days War, the Slovenian Territorial Defense forces blockaded all ten 
JNA bases in Slovenia39.
In Croatia, both citizens and militia blockaded 33 large JNA garrisons and numerous 
smaller facilities, including border posts, weapons and ammunition storage depots40.
Cooperation in the 1990s
In 1990 Yugoslavia remained dependent on the Soviet Union for most of its heavy 
armaments and complex weapons systems, including tanks, armored vehicles, antitank and 
antiaircraft missiles, and ships. Therefore, in 1990 the Yugoslav arms procurement policy aimed 
to expand purchases from the other Warsaw Pact states, the United States, and neutral European 
countries, as well as to increase domestic production. Despite significant progress, self-
sufficiency in arms supply remained elusive for both economic and technological reasons. 
Yugoslavia’s domestic arms industry remained relatively small, and in 1990 it faced declining 
export markets.
That same year, several Yugoslav officers were selected to attend prestigious Soviet 
military academies, which were similar to commandant-staff or war colleges in the United 
States41.
Misha Glenny writes that Tito had realized that Yugoslavia could only exist if Serbia’s 
bureaucracy was kept on a relatively short leash while regional centers would have a high level 
of autonomy.
Under the Titoist state Serbs were put up to on the highest levels in the state administration 
and in the Communist party. It was done for a reason – this was the way in which Tito was trying
to keep balance between the national groups. However, such a policy led to protests among the 
Croatian population and settled a ground for further grievances (Glenny,p.13).
The same idea is shared by Laura Silber, who claims that Tito was trying to avoid previous 
mistakes of falling under the hegemony of the biggest nation – the Serbs, and his post-war 
39 Ibid
40 Sabrina P Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias : State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005 (Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Bloomington, In, 2006). 
41 R  Craig Nation, War in the Balkans, 1991-2002 : [Comprehensive History of Wars Provoked by Yugoslav 
Collapse : Balkan Region in World Politics, Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Greece, 
Turkey, Cyprus (S. L.: Progressive Management],  [I. E, 2003). 
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decisions were drawn to balance institutional power between the republics. (Silber, p.29) When 
this balance was shifted, Yugoslavia started to separate under the pressure of ethnic conflicts and 
economic issues.
Silber draws timeline of a rebellion that took place in Knin, city in Croatia, populated 
mainly with Serbs who located there after WWII. As with examples of Soviet bases mentioned in
the introduction, there were several brigades of JNA in the Dalmatian region42,
The Soviet Union, which was experiencing a series of separations itself, firstly did not 
participate actively in Balkan affairs. The same applied to the Western world, which was 
concentrating on the Middle East. However, a level of cooperation existed, between Milosevic 
and JNA commanders on one side and Russian elites on the other.
Thus, Kadijević made several visits to Moscow in the first months of 1991 that are 
sometimes represented as attempts to plot a military putsch with Soviet support. Whether or not 
this was the case, any hopes for help from Soviet hardliners were removed after the failure of the
abortive August 1991 coup in Moscow.
As for arms supply, Blaz Zgaga and Matej Surc, independent investigators, found out 
routes and sales of weapons being sent from Russia to Slovenia. These including modern SAM 
and AT missiles with Russian/Soviet official military documentation.  Their main supplier was 
Vienna-based Konstantin Dafermos, whose company Scorpion International Services is an 
exclusive representative of Russian state-owned company Rosoboronexport tod43.
In Bosnia, most of the weapons supplied through TWRA (Third World Relief Agency) 
were Soviet-made and bought in various Eastern European countries. Initially, weapons were 
delivered to the Maribor airport in Slovenia, and from there transported overland through 
Croatia. In August and September 1992 more than 120 tons of weapons arrived in Maribor. At 
the end of September, Croatia closed this channel.
This investigation on arms smuggling also covers the Serbian illegal grain trade. Lacking 
oil, Serbian forces in Bosnia were in high need of smuggled fuel. Almost immediately after 
initial sanctions were imposed, the Serbian State Security Service (SDB, Sluzba drzavne 
bezbednosti) organized smuggling channels to supply  Yugoslavia with oil.
42  Marijan Dayor, “The Yugoslav National Army Role in the Aggression Against the Republic of         Croatia 
from 1990 to 1992” (NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE, 2001). 
43 Blaz Zgaza, “Yugoslavia and the Profits of Doom,” EUobserver, December 2, 2011, 
https://euobserver.com/foreign/114482. 
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By far the biggest was the Serbian state-run channel, which involved a number of high 
officials, including one of the Serbian Prime Ministers and one of Deputy Federal Prime 
Ministers from Milosevic’s period. Large amounts of Serbian grain were shipped to Russia, 
where they were bartered for oil. Both the grain and the oil were transported by ships over the 
Danube and the Black Sea 44
2.3 Mercenaries
A series of wars for independence on the continent led to flows of trained mercenaries into 
local conflicts. One of the Croatian soldiers who was fighting against the JNA in 1992 shared 
with me his memories on the Russian presence in the region of that time: “They were (Russian 
contingent) located in the Eastern part of Croatia, so-called Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Sriem,
close to Vukovar. Not only they did nothing as the peacemakers, letting separatists prepare 
themselves, but helped them to illegally import weapons and artillery from Serbia to the 
occupied territory. Moreover, volunteers under command of Arkan, were in charge of selling tree
species, mostly centuries-old oaks. They were looting and transferring ancient icons, pictures and
books to Serbia through the roadblocks that were under Russian troops command. Last ones fully
supported Serbian side”.
Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, Special Rapporteur of the UN Secretary General, discovered 
in 1994 that Russians started serving in the Serbian army (then called JNA) in 1991. Between 
1991 and 1995, JNA’s Russians, along with Ukrainian and Romanian mercenaries, fought in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina against mainly Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) and Croat Bosnian forces. At the 
beginning of the conflict in Bosnia, the Serbs did not have enough pilots and hired Russians to 
fill the gap. In Pale, Republika Srpska, within Bosnia, there was a registered association 
of mercenaries which kept track of the Russian mercenaries who served with the JNA in Bosnia. 
In  1994, Aleksandar Skrabov, a member of the Russian naval infantry, was killed in battle in 
Bosnia. After the end of his mandate in the forces of UNPROFOR, Skrabov had taken command 
of the Russian kontraktniki force in the so-called ‘Army of Republika Srpska’ (VRS). In April 
1995, the commander of the UNPROFOR Sector East forces, the Russian General Pereljakin  
44 Marko Hajdinjak, “SMUGGLING IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE The Yugoslav Wars and the Development of 
Regional Criminal Networks in the Balkans” (CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY, 2002). 
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was appointed as an adviser to the commander of the Baranja division of the Army of the 
‘Krajina’ (RSK) – Serb-occupied Croatia45
 Primary Russian forces consisted of two organized units known as “РДО-1” and “РДО-2” 
(РДО stands for “Русский Добровольческий Отряд”, which means “Russian Volunteer Unit”), 
commanded by Yuriy Belyayev and Alexander Zagrebov, respectively. РДО-2 was also known as
“Tsarist Wolves”, because of the monarchic views of its fighters. There also was unit of Russian 
Cossacks, known as the First Cossack Hundred. All these units were operating mainly in Eastern 
Bosnia along with Rebuplika Srpska forces from 1992 up to 199546.
After the fall of communism, the Cossacks became active as mercenaries in conflict zones. 
They fought in the Georgian breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in Chechnya, 
in Transnistria (Moldova), and in the former Yugoslavia. (Popov, p.147)
Shortly after the war The Guardian’s Luke Harding wrote: “South Ossetian militias, facilitated 
by the Russian army, are carrying out the worst ethnic cleansing since the war in former 
Yugoslavia.”
Miloševic ’s brother Borislav, in his capacity as Serbian ambassador in Moscow, acted as 
the overall coordinator for Russian mercenary recruitment, as well as trafficking of other Russian
war materiel sent to Serbia during the conflict. Yugoslav ABK Bank, which operates a branch 
office in Moscow, was also instrumental in sending Russian kontraktniki to fight in Kosovo. 
Many Russian “kontraktniki” of Cossack origin were recruited by ABK’s Moscow office47.
Several Serbian sources mention that he started his career in Soviet Union because of 
outstanding knowledge of Russian, which he spoke better than Serbian. In the late seventies he 
served as Tito’s personal translator during his meetings with Brezhnev48.
Thus, Milosevic owed his rise to power not to chance but to his astute application of 
political frame leadership behavior. He used his brother’s party influence and connection with 
the KGB. The symbolic relationship with the secret police was one where they knew they needed
Milosevic to stay in power, and he needed them to gain access to even more power within the 
45 Ali Kokhar, “Russian Mercenaries at War in the Balkans,” www.freerepublic.com, July 14, 2003, 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/958701/posts. 
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47 Kurir, “ODLAZAK HEROJA Preminuo Vladimir Jagar, Oficir Koji Je Špegelju Rekao Ne i Odbio Da Ubija 




Communist Party inner circle in his quest to become a member of the political elite49. (Palestini, 
p. 207)
Russian Federation and Serbia: current arms trade
Being an EU membership candidate, Serbia now turned to the West. In 2006 it joined 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and in 2015 Belgrade signed the Individual Partnership 
Action Plan – the highest rung of cooperation between the alliance and a country not aspiring to 
join50.
However, Slavic and Orthodox connections with Russia are still strong and behind Western 
aid there are still grievances left after the Kosovo campaign51.
In 2012 Serbia let Moscow arrange a base for rapid response in emergency situations based
on Nis island. Moreover, numerous visits of delegates from both countries end in large-scale 
weapon purchases (e.g. recent contracts on MiG29 fighters and MI-35M assault helicopters52).
49 Robert H Palestini, Leadership with a Conscience : Educational Leadership as a Moral Science (Lanham 
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Pub. Group, 2012). 
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I started working on this thesis looking for the similar roots in both campaigns – Milosevic 
in the nineties and Putin’s in 2014. Further my research brought me to the core of both conflicts 
– propaganda backed by present military bases on the territory of foreign independent state. 
Moreover, if in 2014, Ukraine’s independence was not questionable, the post-communist periods 
in both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the very beginning of the nineties could be subject to 
dispute.
Analyzing military cooperation between two former republics, I purport that Soviet support
lay mostly in the intelligence field given long history of Russian officers penetration into the 
Yugoslav Army and vast amounts of army supplies.  A party army like the JNA could not have 
objectively defended the state, but could only protect the existing political system and the 
ideology of the political avant garde. When Communism began to collapse, the army tightened 
up in an effort to help the system to survive (G. Petrovic, NIN 6 January 1995).
Examples of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Lithuania mentioned in the introduction 
section illustrate the same scenario that took place on Balkans: country-successor of the 
communist federation, Russia/Serbia, uses propaganda based on language, culture and religion 
and activates its troops based in the independent (for that moment) republics.
Taken that motives for invasion could be different, it is still about the means that make it 
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